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I.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I will discuss the procedural, constitutional, and
prudential issues that plague the current pardoning system employed in
Minnesota. I ultimately advocate for the reform of this process. I begin by
Maddie Post, 2022 Juris Doctor Candidate. The author is a third-year law student at
Mitchell Hamline School of Law. In the summer of 2020, she served as a legal intern for the
Office of Governor Tim Walz and Lieutenant Governor Peggy Flanagan. She is now a law
clerk at the St. Paul City Attorney’s Office. Special thanks to Professor Eric Janus and
Mitchell Hamline Law Review for assisting with this article.
‡
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describing the three grants of clemency that are available in Minnesota:
pardons, commutations of sentences, and pardons extraordinary. 1 Next, I
highlight the issues that burden the pardon system by looking at a particular
applicant’s case: Amreya Shefa. 2 In 2015, Shefa was convicted of first-degree
manslaughter for killing her abusive husband, Habibi Tesema, who
violently sexually assaulted her. 3 Despite her compelling pleas for
forgiveness in front of the Board of Pardons, Shefa was denied a pardon. 4
Amreya Shefa’s case stands as an example of the onerous challenges that
pardon applicants in Minnesota face. 5
Following this, I discuss the importance of pardons in our criminal
justice system. 6 Not only do pardons and pardons extraordinary remedy
many of the legal penalties and disabilities people experience because of
their conviction, they are also a symbol of the reform the applicant has made
in their life. 7 Pardons are recognition from the three highest officials in the
state of Minnesota that an applicant is forgiven for their crime. 8 Despite the
crucial importance of this process, pardons are rarely granted and have been
granted in significantly declining numbers over the last few decades. 9
Next, I discuss why pardons and pardons extraordinary have been
granted in such low numbers over the last few years. 10 First, I begin with the
procedural issues that affect grants of clemency in Minnesota. 11 This
includes increased regulation of the procedural and substantive components
for grants of clemency by the Minnesota Legislature. 12 Next, I examine the
state constitutional issues that burden the pardoning system in Minnesota. 13
The Minnesota Board of Pardons consists of the governor, attorney general,
and chief justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, and all pardons must be
granted through a unanimous vote by the Board. 14 I argue that the structure
of the Board, coupled with the unanimous vote requirement, is inconsistent
with the structure and text of the Minnesota Constitution. 15
Next, I discuss the prudential issues with the Board of Pardons. 16 I

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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14
15
16

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
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argue that the current structure of the Board is unwise policy. 17 I find it
unwise to vest pardoning power exclusively in the hands of three of the top
officials in Minnesota. 18 I also find it unwise for the chief justice of the
Minnesota Supreme Court to be involved in this process. 19
Finally, after discussing the problems that continue to burden the
process of granting pardons in Minnesota, I describe a potential solution to
these issues. 20 I recommend that the Minnesota Legislature pass a law to
create a Clemency Review Commission to change the current structure of
this process. 21 This solution was proposed in a bill in 2019. 22 Unfortunately,
this bill died when the legislative session ended. 23 I argue that legislators
should continue to push for a Clemency Review Commission to reform the
pardoning process in Minnesota. 24
I ultimately conclude that the process for granting pardons in
Minnesota is in dire need of reform and that the Minnesota Legislature
needs to make an active effort in the upcoming legislative session to solve
some of these problems. 25 Pardons and pardons extraordinary play an
incredibly important role in our criminal justice system, and especially in
the lives of those that are granted clemency. 26 It is in the best interest of the
State of Minnesota that this process is fair and unburdened. 27
II.

MINNESOTA’S PARDONING PROCESS

Under Minnesota law, there are three grants of clemency available to
those convicted of a crime: pardons, commutations of sentences, and
pardons extraordinary. 28 A pardon is “an act of forgiveness” that exempts an
applicant from the punishment imposed by their conviction. 29 A
commutation is a reduction of a sentence. 30 Pardons and commutations of
sentences are both available to people currently serving their sentence. 31
From 1940 to 1989, the Board of Pardons commuted 741 sentences,

17
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See infra Part V.C.
See infra Part V.C.1.
See infra Part V.C.2.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
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See infra Part VII.

MINN. STAT. § 638.02 (2020).
2019 Legislative Report, MINN. BD. OF PARDONS 2 (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://www.leg.mn.gov/docs/2020/mandated/200130.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC82-C639].

28
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Id.
Application Process, MINN. DEP’T

OF CORR., https://mn.gov/doc/about/pardonboard/application-process/ [https://perma.cc/7LCT-LZQE].
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granting commutations for eighty-four percent of applicants. 32 However, the
Board of Pardons has only granted one absolute pardon since 1984 33 and
two commutations of sentences since 1981. 34 Because the Board of Pardons
grants absolute pardons and commutations at such a low rate, the most
realistic grant of clemency for applicants to seek is a pardon extraordinary. 35
A pardon extraordinary is “statutorily-created relief granted to
applicants who have served their sentences.” 36 Pardons extraordinary are
granted if the Board of Pardons determines that the person is “of good
character and reputation.” 37 To be eligible for a pardon extraordinary, an
individual convicted of a crime of violence must be crime-free for a
minimum of ten years. 38 For non-violent offenders, the individual must not
commit a crime for five years. 39 Federal offenders and individuals convicted
of crimes in other states are not eligible for a pardon extraordinary. 40 Unless
the Board unanimously votes in writing to put this waiting period aside, an
application for a pardon extraordinary cannot be filed until this time period
has elapsed. 41
The Minnesota Board of Pardons consists of the governor, the
attorney general, and the chief justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. 42
Applications for pardons extraordinary are investigated prior to the Board’s
meeting. 43 The county attorney, the judge involved in the case, and any
victims are asked for input on the application. 44 If the Board grants a pardon
extraordinary, the conviction is set aside and nullified. 45 Once someone is
Andy Mannix & Briana Bierschbach, Far from Grace: How Minnesota Radically Changed
Way
it
Forgives
Criminals,
MINNPOST
(July
30,
2015),
https://www.minnpost.com/politicspolicy/2015/07/far-grace-how-minnesota-radicallychanged-way-it-forgives-criminals/ [https://perma.cc/9KP7-NR8V].
Id. In 2020 the Board granted the first absolute pardon in four decades to Maria Elizondo,
a woman convicted in 2012 of fraudulently receiving $25,000 in food stamps and benefits.
Esme Murphy, Minnesota Board of Pardons Grants First Full Pardon in 37 Years to Maria
Elizondo,
CBS
MINN.
(Jan.
25,
2021),
https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2021/01/25/minnesota-board-of-pardons-grants-first-fullpardon-in-37-years-to-maria-elizondo/ [https://perma.cc/3E6Q-7KMA].
Mannix & Bierschbach, supra note 32. The Board of Pardons granted all three of these
acts of clemency in 2020. 2020 Legislative Report, MINN. BD. OF PARDONS 2 (Feb. 12, 2021),
https://mn.gov/doc/assets/Board%20of%20Pardons%202020%20Report%20%28final%29_t
cm1089-468448.pdf [https://perma.cc/85A4-FNDF].
32

the
33

34

35
36

Id.
Id.

MINN. STAT. § 638.02, subdiv. 2 (2020).
MINN. STAT. § 638.02, subdiv. 2(1) (2020); MINN. STAT. § 624.712, subdiv. 5 (2020)
(defining a “crime of violence”).
MINN. STAT. § 638.02, subdiv. 2(2) (2020).
MINN. CONST. art. V, § 7; MINN. STAT. § 638.01 (2020).
MINN. STAT. § 638.02, subdiv. 2.
MINN. CONST. art. V, § 7.
Minn. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 31.
37
38

39
40
41
42
43
44

Id.

45

MINN. STAT. § 638.02, subdiv. 2(2).
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granted a pardon extraordinary, they will never be required to disclose their
conviction again other than “in a judicial proceeding or as part of the
licensing process for peace officers.” 46 However, a pardon extraordinary
does not expunge the crime or seal the person’s record. 47 After a pardon
extraordinary is granted, a copy of the pardon is filed with the district court
where the conviction occurred. 48 The court is then directed to set aside the
conviction and keep a copy of the pardon on file. 49
III.

EXPOSING THE PROBLEMS: AMREYA SHEFA’S CASE

A. Amreya Shefa’s Conviction and Sentencing
One recent pardon applicant in Minnesota, Amreya Shefa, helps
illuminate the procedural, constitutional, and prudential issues that burden
grants of clemency in this state. Amreya Shefa met Habibi Tesema in Addis
Abba, Ethiopia, in 2006. 50 The couple married one month later. 51 At the
beginning of their marriage, Tesema lived in the United States while Shefa
remained in Ethiopia. 52 Tesema agreed that after the couple had three
children together, he would bring Shefa and the children over to the United
States to live with him. 53 In 2012, after six years of marriage, Tesema brought
Shefa and their two children to live with him in Richfield, Minnesota. 54 Shefa
had no friends, family, or independent income in the United States and
became dependent on Tesema. 55 In contrast, Tesema had lived in the
United States for almost twenty years, spoke English well, worked full-time,
owned a home, and had a large network of friends and family in
Minnesota. 56
After bringing Shefa and the children over to the United States,
Tesema became abusive. 57 Shefa claimed that throughout their marriage,
46
47

Id.
Minnesota Restoration of Rights & Record Relief, RESTORATION oF RTS. PROJECT,

http://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/minnesota-restoration-of-rightspardon-expungement-sealing/ [https://perma.cc/ZW56-F9XY].
See id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 638.02, subdiv. 3).
48
49

Id.

State v. Amreya Rahmeto Shefa, No. 27-CR-13-39734, 2015 WL 1279762, at *1 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2015).

50

Id.
Id.
Id. From 2006 to 2012, Tesema visited Shefa numerous times in Ethiopia. During this
period, Shefa gave birth to two children, a boy and a girl. Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *2.
Matt Sepic, Richfield Woman Asks Pardons Board to Help Her Avoid Persecution in
Home
Country,
MPR
NEWS
(June
26,
2019),
51
52
53

54
55
56
57

https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019/06/26/shefa-clemency-deporation-minnesota-boardpardons [https://perma.cc/F22W-YPNN].
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Tesema forced her to perform sex acts against her will. 58 On one occasion,
Shefa claimed that Tesema and an unknown man had sex with each other
and then sexually assaulted her in the basement of their home. 59 Later,
Tesema told Shefa that as a result of that assault, she “likely had contracted
AIDS.” 60 Shefa has claimed that throughout their marriage, Tesema raped
her frequently, allowed his friends to rape her, beat her, and used her for
forced labor. 61
In a recorded interview, Shefa told Richfield Detective Joseph
Edwards, “I am not even afraid of Allah (God) as I am afraid of [Mr.
Tesema]” and “I am afraid of [Mr. Tesema] all of the time.” 62 Shefa stated
that she never left Tesema because, “I don’t know my way around, I am not
familiar with the country. I don’t have any relative [sic], . . . [I] don’t have
anyone, where do I go? In fact, he was telling me to leave, but where do I
go? I don’t know anyone.” 63 Shefa had no power in the relationship, no
control over the couple’s assets, and remained dependent upon Tesema in
the United States. 64 For these reasons, she remained in the relationship
despite the abuse. 65
On the night of December 1, 2013, Tesema had been drinking alcohol
and smoking khat. 66 Tesema began to initiate sex with Shefa. 67 Shefa claimed
that after the couple had vaginal intercourse, Tesema made her perform
oral sex on him. 68 Then Tesema proceeded to penetrate Shefa’s anus with
a dildo. 69 Tesema played pornographic movies on his computer and asked
her, “If these people are doing it, why can’t you do it?” 70 Tesema asked
Shefa if she would have anal intercourse with him and told her that if she
Id.
Shefa, 2015 WL 1279762, at *2.
Id. At trial, Shefa claimed that Tesema “took her to an unknown hospital where she
received medication for an abortion and AIDS.” Id. No evidence was offered concerning
either the alleged abortion or AIDS at trial. Id. A member of Shefa’s legal team claims she
is now HIV positive. Sepic, supra note 57.
58
59
60

61

Compl. at 10, Shefa v. Ellison, No. 27-CV-20-6768 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 7, 2020).

Shefa, 2015 WL 1279762, at *2.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at *3. Khat is a stimulant drug made from the leaves and twigs of an evergreen shrub
native to Ethiopia. The active ingredients are cathine and cathinone. Drug Fact Sheet: Khat,
62
63
64
65
66

U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/factsheets/khat [https://perma.cc/W6ULEGNZ]. Tesema’s blood was tested for the presence of Khat, but none was found. Shefa,
2015 WL 1279762, at *3 n.2. However, there was no testimony on the amount of time that
Khat would remain in Tesema’s blood after consumption. Id. There was evidence that
Tesema had been drinking; his blood alcohol concentration was .09, and bottles of alcohol
were found at the scene. Id.
Shefa, 2015 WL 1279762, at *3.
67

Id.
Id. Shefa’s account of the assault was corroborated by evidence that two dildos were in the
room where the homicide occurred. Id.
Id.
68
69

70
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refused to have sex with him, he would find someone who would. 71
After Tesema penetrated Shefa with a dildo, Shefa proceeded to pick
up a knife and stab Tesema. 72 Shefa later explained that she had told
Tesema, “No, you’re not going to do that to me! You’re not going to do that
to me!” 73 Shefa stabbed Tesema thirty times. 74 The Chief Hennepin County
Medical Examiner determined that a stab wound through both pumping
chambers of the heart killed Tesema. 75
Shefa was charged with second-degree murder under Minnesota
Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 1(1). 76 Shefa raised two defenses at trial:
self-defense and the heat of passion defense. 77 She requested that the judge
consider the lesser charge of first-degree manslaughter in violation
of Minnesota Statutes section 609.20, subdivision 1. 78 At Shefa’s bench trial,
Judge Elizabeth Cutter denied Shefa’s claim of self-defense, finding that the
number of sharp force injuries inflicted upon Tesema, in addition to his
level of intoxication, indicated that the force Shefa used exceeded the
amount necessary to defend herself. 79 However, the court did find that the
sexual assault was sufficient to show provocation for the use of the heat of
passion defense. 80 Because the court found that the State had not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that Shefa did not act in the heat of passion, she
was convicted of first-degree manslaughter. 81 Shefa served five years in
prison at the Shakopee Correctional Facility without incident and with good
behavior. 82 Upon her pending release, she was charged as removable from
Id. at *6.
Id. at *3. Shefa testified that the knife was in the room because she had used it earlier to
cut an orange. Id. This was corroborated by evidence that there was a sliced orange in the
room. Id.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *7. See MINN. STAT. § 609.19, subdiv. 1(1) (2015). Whoever “causes the death of a
71
72

73
74
75
76

human being with intent to effect the death of that person or another, but without
premeditation” is guilty of murder in the second degree and may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than 40 years. Id.
Shefa, 2015 WL 1279762, at *7. See MINN. STAT. § 609.20(1) (2020). First-degree
manslaughter is when the defendant “intentionally causes the death of another person in the
heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of
ordinary self-control under like circumstances.” Id.
Shefa, 2015 WL 1279762, at *1. Shefa waived her right to a jury prior to the beginning of
trial. Id.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *9. Shefa appealed her case to the Minnesota Court of Appeals in 2016, claiming
that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
she intended to cause the death of Tesema and was not acting in self-defense. State v. Shefa,
No. A15-0974, 2016 WL 3042908, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016). The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court, agreeing that the number of sharp force injuries inflicted
upon Tesema greatly exceeded the degree of force necessary to defend herself. Id.
Compl. at 11, Shefa v. Ellison, No. 27-CV-20-6768 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 7, 2020).
77

78

79
80
81

82
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the United States and taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) custody. 83 Despite finishing her sentence, Shefa was detained at the
Kandiyohi County Jail in Willmar, Minnesota, in anticipation that the
Department of Homeland Security would deport her. 84

B. The Denial of Amreya Shefa’s Pardon Application
After serving her sentence in Shakopee, Shefa filed her first
application for a pardon extraordinary in June of 2018. 85 Her application
was denied because it was “deemed undeserving by the secretary for further
review by the board.” 86 In December of 2018, Shefa filed a second pardon
application. 87 Her second application was also denied on the mistaken
conclusion that the prior application had been denied on its merits. 88
Shefa challenged this denial and was permitted to present the issue
during the Board of Pardons meeting in June of 2019. 89 Shefa begged for
forgiveness over the phone from the Kandiyohi County Jail, where she was
being detained by ICE. 90 She told the Board that if she was not granted a
pardon, she would be deported to Ethiopia. 91 She claimed her husband’s
family in Ethiopia would have her killed if she ever returned. 92 Shefa told
the Board, “I am very remorseful for killing my husband.” 93 At the meeting,
Chief Justice Lori Gildea announced her intention to deny the pardon if
Shefa was allowed to apply. 94 Chief Justice Gildea said, “I don’t support the
pardon. The crime caused the death of a person, so it’s on that basis that I
don’t support Ms. Shefa’s pardon application.” 95
In December of 2019, Shefa requested that the merits of her case go
before the Board of Pardons once again. 96 This request was granted, and the
Board agreed to hear her case at the Board of Pardons meeting in June of
Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2008). Any alien who “(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude committed within five years […] after the date of admission, and (II) is convicted of
a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is deportable.” Id.
Brandon Stahl, Pardon Hearing Set for Rape Survivor Who Served Time After Killing
Husband, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis) (June 17, 2019), https://www.startribune.com/rapesurvivor-gets-her-shot-at-freedom/511420192/ [https://perma.cc/U2ZD-WGRC].
Compl. at 11, Shefa v. Ellison, No. 27-CV-20-6768 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 7, 2020).
Id.
83

84

85
86

Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Sepic, supra note 57.
Brett Hoffland, Minnesota Woman Convicted of Killing Her Husband Pleading for a
Pardon, KSTP (June 25, 2019), https://kstp.com/news/minnesota-woman-convicted-of-

87
88
89
90
91

killing-her-husband-pleading-for-a-pardon/5402752/ [https://perma.cc/LN7K-368W].
92
93
94
95
96

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Compl. at 12, Shefa v. Ellison, No. 27-CV-20-6768 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 7, 2020).
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2020. 97 In her application, Shefa stated that only a pardon or commutation
could serve the interests of justice because although her case was correctly
decided, her case was one of “unfortunate guilt.” 98
Shefa stated that her punishment for killing her husband has been
more than just incarceration. 99 As a result of her conviction, Shefa lost
parental rights, faced possible death at the hands of her husband’s family if
she returned to Ethiopia, and would be unable to manage her HIV in
Ethiopia. 100 Shefa also maintained that domestic violence victims are good
candidates for clemency and that the Board would be sending a message
that gender-based violence would not be tolerated. 101
Despite these compelling pleas, Shefa’s pardon application was
denied. 102 On June 12, 2020, Governor Walz and Attorney General Ellison
voted to grant Shefa’s pardon request. 103 Both officials supported Shefa’s
petition for a pardon extraordinary. 104 However, Chief Justice Gildea voted
to deny Shefa’s petition, just as she said she would. 105 In response, Shefa
filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Governor
Walz, Attorney General Ellison, and Chief Justice Gildea, all in their official
capacities. 106 In the complaint, Shefa challenged the constitutionality of
Minnesota Statutes section 638.02 and its requirement for a unanimous vote
from the Board of Pardons. 107 She claimed that the statute violated the
Minnesota Constitution because the constitution vests the pardoning power
97

Id.

Application for a Pardon or Commutation: Amreya Shefa, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. 4 (Nov.
29, 2018).
Id. at 5.
98

99

100
101

Id.
Id.

102

Compl. at 2, Shefa v. Ellison, No. 62-CV-20-4090 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2020).

103

Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. On May 7, 2020, Shefa filed a lawsuit against Attorney General Ellison in his official

104
105

capacity, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in anticipation of Chief Justice Gildea
denying her pardon application. See Compl., Shefa v. Ellison, No. 27-CV-20-6768 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. May 7, 2020). Shefa claimed that the requirement of a unanimous vote from the
Board of Pardons as required by Minnesota Statutes Section 638.02 violated the pardon
power granted to the governor under the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 2. That case was
dismissed without prejudice, on the basis that Shefa’s claims were not yet ripe for
adjudication. See Order Denying Motion and Order for Judgment, Shefa v. Ellison, No. 27CV-20-6768 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 3, 2020). The district court found that “Chief Justice
Gildea’s comments at Shefa’s June 2019 pardon hearing are insufficient to jeopardize any
constitutional rights that would merit declaratory or injunctive relief. The Court cannot
predict how Chief Justice Gildea . . . will vote regarding Shefa’s pardon application.” Id. at
7. Because Chief Justice Gildea had not yet denied Shefa’s pardon application, Shefa’s injury
was hypothetical and she could not seek relief. Id. After her pardon application was officially
denied at the June meeting, she filed another lawsuit in July. Compl., Shefa v. Ellison, No.
62-CV-20-4090 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2020).
Compl., Shefa v. Ellison, No. 62-CV-20-4090 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2020).
Id. at 13.
106
107
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with the governor. 108 Shefa claimed that “‘[b]ut for the unanimous vote’
required under 638.02,” her pardon would have been granted. 109
Shefa filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to find
Minnesota Statutes section 638.02, subdivision 1 unconstitutional and order
Governor Walz to reconsider her pardon application. 110 Agreeing with
Shefa’s constitutional challenge to the current regulation of the Board of
Pardons, Defendant Governor Walz filed a motion for summary judgment
asking the court to find Minnesota Statutes sections 638.01 and 638.02
unconstitutional 111 and to grant Shefa’s pardon nunc pro tunc. 112 In
opposition, Defendants Attorney General Ellison and Chief Justice Gildea
filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Shefa’s
complaint. 113
Ramsey County Judge Laura Nelson sided with Shefa and Governor
Walz, finding the second sentence of Minnesota Statutes section 638.01
unconstitutional. 114 Judge Nelson found that the plain language of article V,
section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution “names the Governor separate and
apart from the Board of Pardons, of which he is a member.” 115 Based on
this plain language, Judge Nelson concluded that the governor has some
pardon power separate from the Board of Pardons. 116 Accordingly, Judge
Nelson found that Minnesota Statutes sections 638.01 and 638.02,
subdivision 1, which give pardon power to the Board of Pardons alone, are
108

Id. at 13–14.

Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. 11, Shefa v. Ellison, No. 62-CV-204090 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 20, 2020) (quoting the “but for” language utilized by the
governor).
Shefa v. Ellison, No. 62-CV-20-4090, 2021 WL 1679835, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 20,
2021). On June 24, 2021, this matter came before Judge Nelson again to discuss whether
this decision prohibited the Board of Pardons from meeting. Id. Judge Nelson held that the
Board’s constitutional authority, as well as Minnesota Statutes section 638, remains in full
force and effect, except for the second sentence of Minnesota Statutes section 638.01
and Minnesota Statutes section 638.02, subdivision 1. Judge Nelson clarified that nothing in
the order prohibited the Board of Pardons from meeting as mandated by Minnesota Statutes
section 638.04. Id.
Despite his position as a defendant in the lawsuit, Governor Walz sided with the plaintiff.
Because of this stance, he obtained outside counsel with the Ciresi Conlin law firm. Stephen
Montemayor, Minnesota’s Unanimous Pardon Board Requirement Ruled Unconstitutional,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis) (Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-sunanimous-pardon-board-requirement-ruled-unconstitutional/600048574/?refresh=true
[https://perma.cc/2R2B-X2QZ].
Id. A nunc pro tunc entry is an entry made now of something actually previously done to
have effect of the former date. Lazar v. Ganim, 220 A.3d 18, 33 n.4 (Conn. 2019) (expressing
nunc pro tunc literally means “now for then.”).
Shefa v. Ellison, No. 62-CV-20-4090, 2021 WL 3440678, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 2,
2021).
Montemayor, supra note 111.
Shefa v. Ellison, No. 62-CV-20-4090, 2021 WL 1679835, at *6 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 20,
2021).
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110

111
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unconstitutional. 117
The defendants appealed Judge Nelson’s ruling to the Minnesota
Supreme Court. 118 On September 16, 2021, a day after hearing oral
arguments, Justice G. Barry Anderson, signed an order reversing Judge
Nelson’s ruling. 119 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the statutes
governing the Board are constitutional. 120 The court issued the order prior
to releasing an opinion “[s]o as not to impair the orderly function of the
board of pardons.” 121
Amreya Shefa’s case illustrates the multitude of issues that plague the
current pardoning system in Minnesota. Her case demonstrates the
procedural issues that burden the current process, such as when her
application was denied because the Board mistakenly believed that her case
had been denied on the merits. 122 Her case also demonstrates the
constitutional issues that are presented when the head of the judiciary, Chief
Justice Gildea, has absolute veto power over a process originally designed
for the executive of Minnesota’s government to grant. 123 There are also
prudential issues that arise when offenders go before the head of the
judiciary to ask for mercy. 124 Amreya Shefa’s case exemplifies many of the
issues that burden this system today.
IV.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PARDONS

The pardoning process in Minnesota needs reform because of the
crucial role clemency plays in the criminal justice system and in the lives of
those convicted of crimes. Pardons extraordinary in Minnesota are a grant
of clemency that give those convicted of a crime the opportunity to discharge
many of the lingering consequences of a criminal conviction. 125 In addition
to a court-imposed sentence, individuals with criminal convictions also face
a range of legal penalties and disabilities. 126 After a conviction, many face a
loss of civil rights, limited access to housing, loss of employment, and loss
of welfare benefits. 127 In addition to the permanent changes to an individual’s
117

Id.

Shefa v. Ellison, 964 N.W.2d 157 (Minn. 2021).
Id.
Id. Chief Justice Gildea recused herself from the case because of her status as a defendant
in the matter. Brian Bakst, MN Supreme Court Blocks Remake of Pardon Process, MPR
NEWS (Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2021/09/16/mn-supreme-courtblocks-remake-of-pardon-process [https://perma.cc/8N9V-93J6].
118
119
120

121

Id.

122

Compl. at 11, Shefa v. Ellison, No. 27-CV-20-6768 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 7, 2020).

123

See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
Board of Pardons, MINN. DEP’T

124

OF CORR., https://mn.gov/doc/about/pardon-board/
[https://perma.cc/ERX5-TDMS].
Margaret Colgate Love, Relief from the Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction:
A State-by-State Resource Guide 6 (2005).
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126

127

Id.

317

318

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 48:1

legal status, criminal convictions are accompanied by stigma, discrimination,
and shame. 128

A. Pardons Play an Important Role in the Lives of Individuals Who Have
Committed a Crime
In Minnesota, a felony conviction deprives individuals serving their
sentence of their civil rights and full citizenship. 129 These rights include the
right to vote, hold office, and own a firearm. 130 Upon release from their
sentence, the right to vote and hold office is restored. 131 However, the right
to a firearm is not restored upon release. 132 Rights to a firearm may be
regained if the individual petitions the court for restoration. 133 A court “may
grant the relief sought if the person shows good cause to do so and the
person has been released from physical confinement.” 134 However,
individuals convicted of a “crime of violence” are “not entitled to ship,
transport, possess, or receive a firearm or ammunition for the remainder of
[their] lifetime.” 135
Additionally, a pardon extraordinary has immense value for convicted
individuals looking for employment. 136 While it is the policy of the State of
Minnesota to encourage the rehabilitation of individuals convicted of a
crime through the opportunity to “secure employment or to pursue,
practice, or engage in a meaningful and profitable trade, occupation,
vocation, profession, or business,” there are numerous setbacks to getting
employment post-conviction. 137 In Minnesota, public and private employers
are prohibited from inquiring into the criminal record or history of an
applicant until the applicant has been selected for an interview. 138 However,
this law does not require or encourage private and public employers to hire
individuals once they look into their criminal history. 139
128
129
130
131

Id.
Id. at Minnesota-1.
Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.195 (2005)).
Id. The right to hold public office is still deprived if the individual was convicted of bribery.

MINN. STAT. § 609.42, subdiv. 2 (2020).
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 609.165, subdiv. 1(a) (2020).
Id. § 609.165, subdiv. 1(d).
Id. § 609.165, subdiv. 1(a).
Mannix & Bierschbach, supra note 32.
LOVE, supra note 126.
MINN. STAT. § 364.021(a). Governor Dayton signed the Criminal Background Check bill,
which expanded Ban the Box to private employers starting on January 1, 2014. This
requirement has been in effect for public employers in Minnesota since 2009. Criminal
Background Checks, Facts About Ban the Box, MINN. DEP’T OF HUM. RTS.,
https://mn.gov/mdhr/employers/criminal-background/ [https://perma.cc/H8EH-4D4G].
Technical
Guidance
364.021,
MINN.
DEP’T
HUM.
RTS.,
https://mn.gov/mdhr/assets/Technical
Guidance
364.021_tcm1061-213501.pdf
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
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In addition, for many, a pardon extraordinary is a symbol of the reform
they have made in their lives. 140 A pardon extraordinary is recognition from
three of the highest-ranking officials in Minnesota that someone convicted
of a crime has turned their life around. 141 Contrary to what many may think,
a pardon does not necessarily imply that the underlying conviction is
invalid. 142 More often, it is recognition of the individual’s post-conviction
rehabilitation. 143 Much of what a post-conviction pardon does is lessen the
psychological stigma for an individual convicted of a crime. 144 After receiving
his pardon extraordinary from the Minnesota Board of Pardons, former
convict Seth Evans commented, “I know that God has forgiven me for the
things I have done, but I feel that finally the state of Minnesota has forgiven
me and I don’t have to keep going back into those boxes and look at that
person.” 145 This forgiveness from the state is an important part of pardons
extraordinary for many. 146

B. Pardons Are an Important Part of Our Criminal Justice System
The use of pardon power is an essential element of mercy within the
American criminal justice system. 147 Pardoning individuals for the crimes
they have committed has ancient, historical roots. 148 Clemency has been
around since the code of Hammurabi and classical Rome. 149 This process
was used in English common law and, from there, incorporated into the text
of the United States Constitution. 150 The framers of the United States
Constitution were explicit in connecting the pardon power with notions of
mercy. 151 Alexander Hamilton wrote that the president had the unfettered
[https://perma.cc/E7CF-JSS3]. This law actually encourages more discriminatory conduct by
employers by encouraging racial discrimination. It is likely that many employers use race as
a substitute for direct information about criminal background. D.J. Tice, So You 'Banned
the Box.' How Did That Work Out?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis) (May 25, 2018),
https://www.startribune.com/so-you-banned-the-box-how-did-that-work-out/483744171/
[https://perma.cc/9LJ7-M3DY].
Mannix & Bierschbach, supra note 32.
Id.
Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification of Executive
Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 33 (2005).
140
141
142

143
144

Id.
Id.

Stephen Montemayor, Gov. Tim Walz Weighs Changes to State Pardon System, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis) (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/gov-tim-walz-weighschanges-to-state-pardon-system/569270562/ [https://perma.cc/6DTK-5TXG].
145

146

Id.

Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clemency
and a Plan for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2015).
Morison, supra note 142.
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148
149
150

Id.
Id.

Daniel T. Kobil, Should Mercy Have a Place in Clemency Decisions?, in FORGIVENESS,
MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 36, 39 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007).
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power to dispense “the mercy of government” so that justice did not appear
too “sanguinary and cruel.” 152
At the Constitutional Convention, James Iredell argued that pardons
were necessary because a person may violate the law, “yet peculiar
circumstances . . . may entitle him to mercy.” 153 Pardons and commutations
of sentences have historically been described by jurists as based on
principles of mercy. 154 As Chief Justice John Marshall remarked in 1833,
“[a] pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed,
from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.” 155 Thus,
mercy-based clemency has historical and philosophical roots in the
American criminal justice system. 156 While some argue that mercy should
be left entirely to philosophers or theologians, it is difficult to ignore the
important role mercy plays in our criminal justice system. 157
Additionally, pardons play an important political role by signaling
issues within our criminal justice system. 158 The Framers intended pardons
to not only be rooted in mercy, but also to assist in balancing between the
branches of the government. 159 Out of political motivations, legislators are
more prone to create harsh sentences for crimes. 160 Politicians are prone to
react to the public and the media in response to crime. 161 The pardon power
brings some balance to these tough sentences. 162 Pardons send political
messages to both the legislative and judicial branches about good criminal
justice policy. 163 This influence is incredibly important to maintaining a fair
and balanced system. 164 For all of the above reasons, pardons play a crucial
role in our criminal justice system and in the lives of those that seek a grant
of clemency.
V.

THE PROBLEMS THAT PLAGUE THE USE OF THE
PARDON POWER IN MINNESOTA

Historically, the Minnesota Board of Pardons granted pardons
regularly and frequently. 165 Pardons and commutations were even regularly

152
153
154
155
156
157

Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 150 (1833).
Kobil, supra note 151.

Id.
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Barkow & Osler, supra note 147.
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Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 11.
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Barkow & Osler, supra note 147, at 18.
Mannix & Bierschbach, supra note 32.
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granted to both violent and non-violent offenders alike. 166 From 1940 to
1989, the Board granted eighty-seven percent of all applications for pardons
and commutations. 167 Additionally, pardons extraordinary were granted for
nearly every single applicant who applied for one. 168 Pardons extraordinary
were denied only six percent of the time during this period. 169 Pardons and
pardons extraordinary were granted even in cases involving murder,
robbery, and sexual abuse. 170
Since then, the process has shifted dramatically. Only about a third of
pardons extraordinary are granted a year. 171 Additionally, pardons
extraordinary are only granted to individuals who committed non-violent
crimes and waited at least a decade before applying. 172 In 2015, Governor
Mark Dayton remarked that the Board would not consider a pardon for
somebody accused of sexual assault. 173 Dayton commented, “The statute
and the rules don’t prevent them from applying, so it comes down to us to
say we are not going to consider that, basically, ‘Don’t come back.’” 174 This
is a substantial change from the days when the Board regularly granted
pardons extraordinary for almost any applicant, including those convicted
of violent crimes. 175

A. The Procedural Issues with Minnesota’s Pardoning Process
The decline in pardons in Minnesota reflects greater trends in other

166
167
168
169
170
171

Id.
Id. (citing data from the Minnesota Department of Corrections).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ruben Rosario, Does Minnesota ‘Have a Compassion Problem’ When Issuing Pardons?,

ST.
PAUL
PIONEER
PRESS
(Minn.)
(Dec.
9,
2018),
https://www.twincities.com/2018/12/09/rosario-too-few-pardons-in-minnesota-even-lessthan-alabama-time-for-change/ [https://perma.cc/GJH4-YG5A].
Restoration of Rts. Project, supra note 47.
Mannix & Bierschbach, supra note 32.
172
173

Id.
Id. The possibility of re-offense continues to be something that Board members are
frequently concerned about. See id. During his time on the Board of Pardons, Governor

174
175

Mark Dayton expressed concern about the possibility of those who are granted pardons
reoffending. He stated, “[n]o matter how careful you are or how careful all three of you are,
and the whole scrutiny that went into it before, there’s always that risk that somebody could
go out and reoffend, and God forbid reoffend more severely.” Id. Former Governor Tim
Pawlenty did have a pardon applicant reoffend. Id. In 2010, a Blue Earth County prosecutor
charged Jeremy Giefer with sexually abusing his daughter more than 200 times. Id. In 2007,
Pawlenty and the Board of Pardons had granted Giefer a pardon extraordinary for Giefer’s
1994 statutory rape conviction, in part because Giefer had married the victim and raised a
child with her. Id. The timing of Giefer’s re-offense looked particularly bad at the time
because Pawlenty was running for president, and part of his legacy as governor was being
tough on sex offenders. Id.
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states and with the federal government. 176 In the 1980s, criminal justice
reform was focused on getting tough on crime. 177 Following a push from
Congress for harsher sentences, the rate of federal clemency dropped. 178
Minnesota followed with similar tough-on-crime measures in the 1980s. 179
Minnesota became the first state to adopt legally binding sentencing
guidelines. 180 These guidelines provide judges with much less discretion on
individual cases. 181 Additionally, Minnesota got rid of its parole board in
exchange for supervised release. 182 Following these reforms, there was a
decline in the number of pardons granted. 183
A number of regulations imposed on Minnesota’s pardoning process
create procedural issues for those seeking a grant of clemency. One reason
for the shift in the use of pardoning power in Minnesota is due to statutes
passed by the Minnesota Legislature in 1992 that make it significantly more
difficult for applicants to apply for a pardon. 184 Research during this time
period indicated that more than fifty percent of convicted individuals
released from prison were arrested for a new felony or gross misdemeanor
in Minnesota within three years of their release. 185 Faith in the pardoning
system waned, and legislators found that there was more to lose than gain
when individuals were granted pardons. 186 This led the Minnesota
See Aliza B. Kaplan & Venetia Mathew, The Governor’s Clemency Power: An Underused
Tool to Mitigate the Impact of Measure 11 in Oregon, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. R., 1285, 1308
(2020).
176

177
178

Id.
Id. at 1310. “Just prior to the Sentencing Reform Act passing in 1984, President Carter

granted full pardons to 33% of the petitions he received, which was a lower percentage than
many of his recent predecessors such as President Nixon at about 51% and President Ford
at 39%. As the president who signed the Act, Ronald Reagan granted full pardons to about
19% of petitions received during his eight years in office. President George H.W. Bush
granted pardons to about 10% of petitions received. President Clinton granted full pardons
to about 20% of petitions received and President George W. Bush granted full pardons to
only 7.5% of petitions. In President Obama’s first term, he granted an even lower rate than
his predecessor.” Id.
Mannix & Bierschbach, supra note 32.
Id.
179
180
181
182
183
184
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Recidivism of Minnesota Felons, OFF. OF THE LEGIS. AUDITOR STATE OF MINN. (Jan.

1997),
https://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/9701-ch3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2SR-QBGK]. “Overall, we found that about 59 percent of the offenders
released from prison in 1992 were arrested for a new felony or gross misdemeanor in
Minnesota within three years, and an additional 5 percent were rearrested for a felony or
gross misdemeanor outside of Minnesota during the three-year follow-up period. During the
three years, 45 percent were convicted of a new offense in Minnesota, and 40 percent were
imprisoned for new offenses or technical violations of their supervised release.” Id.
Mannix & Bierschbach, supra note 32. In addition, national attention was brought to
186
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Legislature to put substantially more requirements on the pardoning
process in an effort to reduce these negative consequences. 187
The Minnesota Legislature created new procedural and substantive
requirements for pardon applicants in 1992. 188 The legislature added the
requirement that individuals convicted of crimes of violence must be crimefree for a minimum of ten years prior to applying. 189 Additionally, nonviolent offenders were required to be crime-free for a minimum of five
years. 190 In addition to these added requirements, the Minnesota Legislature
removed a benefit of the pardon extraordinary. 191 No longer would an
applicant’s record be sealed once they were granted a pardon
extraordinary. 192 Even after receiving a pardon extraordinary, the crime
would remain on the applicant’s criminal history. 193 Finally, the legislature
added the requirement that an applicant must be in “good character and
reputation” to be eligible to apply. 194 These procedural changes are one of
the reasons grants of clemency are so rare in Minnesota today.
Changes to the application process for pardons have made the process
difficult and rigorous, which may deter many individuals from completing
an application. 195 Applications have steadily dropped since the 1980s. 196 In
the 1980s, 522 applicants went before the Board. 197 From 1990 to 1999, the
Board heard applications from 365 individuals. 198 From 2000 to 2010, the
Board only heard 224 applications. 199 This is a fifty-seven percent decrease
from the 1980s. 200
To apply for a pardon, an applicant must fill out a lengthy
application. 201 The applicant must describe, in detail, their conviction, their
clemency issues when in 1986, the Massachusetts Department of Correction granted Willie
Horton a furlough from prison. Id. Horton was in prison for killing a gas station attendant
during a robbery. Id. When Horton’s furlough was over, he did not return to prison and
subsequently raped a woman at gunpoint and beat her fiancé. Id. This brought to the
attention of many the potential dangers of releasing violent offenders from prison. Id.
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Application for Pardon Extraordinary, MINN.
https://mn.gov/doc/assets/APPLICATIONPARDON%20EXTRAORDINARY_tcm1089-361195.pdf
ZR2B].
Mannix & Bierschbach, supra note 32.
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Minn. Bd. of Pardons, supra note 194.
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previous applications for pardons, and their criminal history. 202 If an
applicant fails to disclose any portion of their criminal history, the Board of
Pardons may view this as a failure to disclose an applicant’s criminal
record. 203 The applicant then must detail their current and past employment
and education. 204 In addition, the applicant must detail all of the steps they
have taken to improve themselves since their conviction. 205 This may include
community service, volunteer activities, support groups, and service to
family members. 206 The applicant must also explain to the Board why they
deserve a pardon and what a pardon would help them accomplish. 207
Applicants should also arrange witnesses to speak on their behalf as well as
up to three letters of recommendation. 208
Once submitted, the application will go through a rigorous background
check to ensure that the information on the application is correct. 209 The
Commissioner of Corrections will reject all applications that are not eligible
according to the criteria. 210 The information in the application is checked
against other records such as “records from prison, probation or supervised
release, courts, and driving records.” 211 The Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (“BCA”) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) will
then verify that the applicant has been crime-free. 212 The Department of
Corrections will also publish notice in a newspaper in the county the
applicant was convicted, indicating the applicant’s crime, conviction date,
and that the applicant is now seeking a pardon extraordinary. 213
This process is intimidating and difficult for applicants. Those that
qualify may not even know how to begin the process without the assistance
of an attorney. 214 Individuals who qualify for a pardon extraordinary often
do not even know the process exists. 215 Governor Tim Walz found that the
pardon process was in serious need of reform when at his first Board of
Id.
Id. Applicants must include all convictions they have received since their release. Id. This
includes even misdemeanor traffic convictions. Id. Additionally, while the Board of Pardons
202
203

only grants pardons for convictions that occur in Minnesota, applicants must include all
convictions in other state or countries and all violations of condition of release (including
supervised release, conditional release, and parole) in their application to the Board. Id.
204
205
206
207
208

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Board:
Application
Process,
MINN.
DEP’T.
CORR.,
https://mn.gov/doc/about/pardon-board/application-process/
[https://perma.cc/PP9H94RT].
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Id.
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Montemayor, supra note 145.
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Pardons hearing, he and his staff concluded that the way convicts learn
about eligibility and apply for pardons is “random.” 216
For many, the strict application requirements and the lack of
information for applicants are primary issues that plague the pardoning
process. 217 In addition to this, I argue that the prudential and constitutional
issues accompanying the unique structure of the Minnesota Board of
Pardons are also largely to blame.

B. The Constitutional Issues with Minnesota’s Pardoning System

218

The power to grant pardons in Minnesota is established by the
Minnesota Constitution. 219 Article V, section 7 of the Minnesota
Constitution establishes a Board of Pardons consisting of the governor,
attorney general, and chief justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. 220 The
Minnesota Constitution states that “[t]he governor in conjunction with the
board of pardons has power to grant reprieves and pardons after conviction
for an offense against the state except in cases of impeachment.” 221 This
process is further regulated by Minnesota Statutes section 638.02, which
says that pardons cannot be granted unless there is “a unanimous vote of
the board duly convened.” 222 This, in effect, gives each member of the Board
absolute veto power over every pardon application. 223 The structure of the
Board and the unanimous vote requirement create constitutional issues that
burden our pardoning system.
By requiring a unanimous vote by the Board of Pardons to grant a
pardon, section 638.02 violates the separation of powers among the
branches of the government required by the Minnesota Constitution. 224
Separation of powers among the three branches of the Minnesota
government is an essential part of our governing system. Article III, section
1 of the Minnesota Constitution states that “[t]he powers of government
shall be divided into three distinct departments: legislative, executive and
judicial.” 225 Each branch of Minnesota’s government is separate and

216
217

Id.
Id.

In this paper, constitutional issues with the Minnesota Board of Pardons refers to issues
with the Minnesota Constitution, not the United States Constitution.
MINN. CONST. art. V, § 7.
218

219
220
221

Id.
Id.

MINN. STAT. § 638.02, subdiv. 1 (2020).
See id. By requiring a unanimous vote, each member of the Board has the power to
unilaterally reject an applicant’s application. Id. Even if a majority of the Board agrees to
grant a pardon, one vote against the applicant dismisses the application. See id.
See MINN. STAT. § 638.02 (2020); see also MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1.
MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1.
222
223

224
225

325

326

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 48:1

independent of the other branches. 226 No single department can exert
control over any other department in the exercise of its official duties
prescribed by the Minnesota Constitution. 227
Furthermore, the Minnesota Legislature cannot change the form of
government created by the Minnesota Constitution if it would destroy the
independence of any department or allow one department to control
another department’s exercise of its powers. 228 Unlike the United States
Constitution, separation of powers is not only a principle that guides the
structure of the Minnesota Constitution, it is expressly provided for within
the Minnesota Constitution. 229 Article III, section 1, explicitly requires that
“[n]o person or persons belonging to or constituting one of these
departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either
of the others except in the instances expressly provided in this
constitution.” 230
Additionally, the pardon power has traditionally belonged to the
Executive Department. The pardon power is listed under article V of the
Minnesota Constitution, “the Executive Department.” 231 This article of the
Minnesota Constitution lists all the powers of the governor, lieutenant
governor, and executive officers. 232 The only section of article V of the
Minnesota Constitution that grants power to another branch of the
government is section 7, conferring pardon power upon the Board of
Pardons. 233
Historically, the pardon power in Minnesota was solely vested in the
governor. 234 This power was taken away in 1897 235 through a legislatively
referred amendment to the Minnesota Constitution. 236 A legislatively
State ex rel. Birkeland v. Christianson, 179 Minn. 337, 339–340, 229 N.W. 313, 314
(Minn. 1930) (“The three departments of state government, the legislative, executive, and
judicial, are independent of each other. Neither department can control, coerce, or restrain
the action or nonaction of either of the others in the exercise of any official power or duty
conferred by the Constitution, or by valid law, involving the exercise of discretion.”).
Id. Separation of powers is not necessarily absolute division of governmental functions.
See Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. 1999) (“The separation of powers
doctrine is based on the principle that when the government’s power is concentrated in one
of its branches, tyranny and corruption will result.”).
State ex rel. Birkeland, 179 Minn. at 340, 229 N.W. at 314.
See MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1.
226

227

228
229
230
231
232
233

Id.
See id. at art. V.
Id.
Id. at § 7.

MINN. CONST. of 1857 art. V, § 4. The 1857 Minnesota Constitution provided that the
“governor shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons after convictions against the
State.” Id. This vested the pardoning power solely in the hands of the governor. See id.
1895 Minn. Laws ch. 2, §1 (codified at MINN. CONST. of 1897 art. V, § 4).
State Constitutional Amendments Considered, MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR.,
https://www.leg.mn.gov/lrl/mngov/constitutionalamendments
[https://perma.cc/KL6N54BB].
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referred constitutional amendment is a referendum that appears on a state’s
ballot as a ballot measure after the legislature has proposed a constitutional
amendment and passed a bill to put the amendment before the voters of
the state. 237 The Minnesota Legislature proposed to take away the sole
pardoning power from the governor through one of these referendums. 238
The amendment was intended to take the sole pardon power away from the
governor by giving the governor pardon power only “in conjunction with the
board of pardons.” 239 Out of 337,229 voters, 130,354 were in favor of the
amendment, and 45,097 were opposed. 240 With this vote, the Minnesota
Constitution was amended, and the governor no longer possessed sole
pardoning power. 241
This amendment materially altered the pardon power under the
Minnesota Constitution by conferring a power that was historically reserved
for the Executive Department upon the Board of Pardons. 242 Pardoning
power has traditionally been considered an executive function. Despite the
Board of Pardons wielding pardoning power since 1897, pardoning power
has continued to be considered an executive function in Minnesota. In
1949, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that pardons are an
executive function. 243 In State v. Meyer, the Minnesota Supreme Court
found that “a pardon is [an] exercise of executive clemency.” 244 Not only is
pardoning power traditionally considered an executive function in
Minnesota, but it is also recognized throughout the country as a power
typically belonging to the executive.
In 1833, Chief Justice John Marshall described pardons as “an act of
grace, proceeding from the power intrusted [sic] with the execution of the
laws.” 245 In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, the Supreme Court
Legislatively
Referred
Constitutional
Amendment,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Legislatively_referred_constitutional_amendment
[https://perma.cc/H3B7-KPM8]. A legislatively referred constitutional amendment is a
limited form of direct democracy in comparison with an initiated constitutional amendment.
Id. With an initiated constitutional amendment, the voters propose the amendment and
approve it. Id. In this case, the voters did not propose the amendment to the Minnesota
Constitution, the Minnesota Legislature did. See MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR., supra note
236.
1895 Minn. Laws ch. 2, §1 (codified at MINN. CONST. of 1897 art. V, § 4).
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State v. Meyer, 228 Minn. 286, 301, 37 N.W.2d 3, 13 (Minn. 1949) (finding that “laws
vesting in administrative boards the authority to determine how a convict should be handled
after conviction interfere with the pardoning power vested in the executive or a pardon board
most frequently stems from the failure to distinguish between a pardon or reprieve and a
parole or probation.”).
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stated that “the clemency and pardon powers are committed, as is our
tradition, to the authority of the executive.” 246 In Connecticut Board of
Pardons v. Dumschat, the Court held that “pardon and commutation
decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts.” 247 Despite the
continued acknowledgment that pardons are traditionally an executive
function and not a function of the judicial branch, the Minnesota Board of
Pardons involves the judicial branch by making the head of the judicial
branch a member of the board with absolute veto power. 248
Additionally, the text of the Minnesota Constitution vests the pardoning
power in the governor “in conjunction with” the Board of Pardons. 249 This
implies that the power is still vested with the governor but adds a
requirement that the governor must consult with the other members of the
Board. 250 Minnesota Statutes section 638.02 is inconsistent with the language
of the Minnesota Constitution by turning a mere consultation with the
Board into a requirement for a unanimous vote. 251 That unanimous vote in
effect gives both the attorney general and the chief justice absolute veto
power. 252 This is inconsistent with the text of the Minnesota Constitution by
giving the other members of the Board equal footing with the governor. 253
This was Judge Laura Nelson’s conclusion in her ruling in Amreya Shefa’s
lawsuit against the Board of Pardons. 254
Ruling in favor of Shefa and Governor Walz’s challenges to the
constitutionality of the Board of Pardons, Judge Laura Nelson found that
because Minnesota Statutes section 638.01 and section 638.02, subdivision
1 do not give effect to the language “the Governor in conjunction with,”
these statutes are unconstitutional. 255 Judge Nelson found that the plain
language of article V, section 7, names the governor “separate and apart
from the Board of Pardons, of which he is a member.” 256 Based on this plain
language, and applying the canon against surplusage, Judge Nelson agreed
that the Minnesota Constitution confers some pardon power upon the

has been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is
our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance.”).
Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 276 (1998).
Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981).
See MINN. CONST. art. V, § 7; see also MINN. STAT. § 638.02 (2020).
MINN. CONST. art. V, § 7.
Mark Osler, A New Pardons Process Would Nix Drama, Meet Constitutional Standard,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis) (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.startribune.com/a-new-pardonsprocess-would-nix-drama-meet-constitutional-standard/562859252/ [https://perma.cc/2FJYSRLG].
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See Shefa v. Ellison, No. 62-CV-20-4090, 2021 WL 3440678 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 2, 2021).
Id. at *6.
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governor separate from the Board of Pardons. 257 This makes the second
sentence of Minnesota Statutes section 638.01 and Minnesota Statutes
section 638.02, subdivision 1, which give pardon power to the Board of
Pardons alone, unconstitutional. 258 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected
this interpretation, holding that both statutes that govern the Board of
Pardons are constitutional. 259
Furthermore, if the Minnesota Legislature intended for the Minnesota
Constitution to require a unanimous vote by the Board, the Minnesota
Constitution would likely have been amended to require the “advice and
consent” of the other board members. 260 This is a term used at both the
federal and state level in constitutions when drafters intend for there to be
consultation with a secondary party over a decision. 261 If the lawmakers
wanted the governor to receive consent from the attorney general and the
chief justice on the granting of pardons, then the Minnesota Constitution
would reflect that. 262 However, the drafters did not do that, implying that the
power is still vested in the governor as the head of the executive
department. 263
Id. The canon against surplusage is a canon of construction that favors “giving each word
or phrase in a statute a distinct, not an identical, meaning.” State v. Thonesavanh, 904
N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2017).
Shefa, 2021 WL 3440678 at *6.
Shefa v. Ellison, 964 N.W.2d 157 (Minn. 2021). At oral arguments Justice G. Barry
Anderson expressed skepticism about this argument: “If the Legislature or in the
constitutional amendment, the intention had been that the governor’s vote is indispensable
it would have said it in the constitutional amendment or said it in the statute,” Justice
Anderson said. “It doesn’t say it in either place. We have to get there by implication.” Bakst,
supra note 120.
Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 437. This is one of the arguments Shefa and Governor Walz
advanced in their case. See Shefa 2021 WL 3440678, at *4. Shefa and Governor Walz
further argued that the correct interpretation of article V, section 7 of the Minnesota
Constitution would require a pardon to be effective if the governor and one other member
of the Board voted in favor of the pardon. Id. Judge Nelson refused to address whether this
argument was correct, stating that she did not “have the authority to determine how pardons
should be granted or the voting procedure amongst those with pardon power.” Id.
Shefa, 2021 WL 3440678 at *4.
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Id.
Id. While the argument about the interpretation of the Board of Pardons clause has merit,

one issue with this argument is that pardoning power was intentionally taken away from the
governor in 1897 through a legislatively referred constitutional amendment referendum.
1895 Minn. Laws ch. 2, §1 (codified at MINN. CONST. of 1897 art. V, § 4). Critics of the
current interpretation of the power vested to the Board of Pardons claim that the unanimous
vote requirement oversteps the “in conjunction with” requirement of the Minnesota
Constitution by denying the governor their constitutionally conferred power to pardon.
MINN. CONST. art. V, § 7. This argument, however, ignores that the pardoning power was
intentionally taken from the governor through an amendment to the Minnesota Constitution.
See MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR., supra note 236. Article V, section 7 of the Minnesota
Constitution states that the Board’s “powers and duties shall be defined and regulated by
law.” MINN. CONST. art 5, § 7. This expressly states that the Board is subject to statutory
regulations and limitations. Id.

329

330

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 48:1

C. Prudential Issues with the Board of Pardons
In addition to the ways in which the current pardoning system is
inconsistent with the text and structure of the Minnesota Constitution, there
are also prudential considerations. While constitutional arguments contend
that the structure of the Board of Pardons and the unanimous vote
requirement under Minnesota Statutes section 638.02 violate the Minnesota
Constitution, prudential arguments assert policy considerations. The
argument here is that the current structure of the Board of Pardons, which
puts all grants of clemency in the hands of the chief executive, attorney
general, and the chief supreme court justice, is unwise policy.

1. It Is Not Wise to Vest All Pardons in the Hands of the Top Officials
in Minnesota State Government.
The Minnesota Constitution vests pardoning power in three of the
most powerful individuals in the state of Minnesota: the governor, attorney
general, and chief justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. 264 Leaving this
process to three of the busiest people in Minnesota creates a “bottleneck
problem” that slows the process for anyone seeking a pardon. 265 The Board
of Pardons is one of the many powerful jobs these officials are tasked with. 266
Pardon applications are heard infrequently—only two times a year by the
governor, attorney general, and chief justice. 267 These three officials have
little time to devote to granting pardons. 268 Because of the limited amount of
time the Board has, only a few cases can be heard every year. 269 Between
MINN. CONST. art. V, § 7.
Montemayor, supra note 145 (quoting DFL State Representative from Minneapolis, Jamie
Long).
Under the Minnesota Constitution, the governor is the head of the executive branch in
Minnesota. See MINN. CONST. art. V, § 3 (“[The governor] is the commander-in-chief of the
military and naval forces and may call them out to execute the laws, suppress insurrection
and repel invasion.”). The governor is also tasked with appointing notaries and other officers.
Id. The governor appoints commissioners and fills vacancies that occur in the offices of
secretary of state, state auditor, attorney general, and other state and district officers. Id. “The
attorney general is the chief legal officer of the State of Minnesota.” About Our Office, THE
OFF. OF MINN. ATT’Y GEN. KEITH ELLISON, https://www.ag.state.mn.us/office/
[https://perma.cc/37YY-95MW]. The Attorney General’s Office provides legal
representation to state agencies, boards, and commissions and represents the State of
Minnesota in state and federal court and administrative hearings. Id. The chief justice of the
Minnesota Supreme Court is the head of the highest court in Minnesota. See generally
MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 1. The Minnesota Supreme Court is tasked with hearing appeals as
well as functioning as the rule-making body for all of Minnesota’s state courts. Minnesota
Supreme Court, MINN. JUD. BRANCH, https://mncourts.gov/SupremeCourt.aspx
[https://perma.cc/MMJ5-23NQ]. The Minnesota Supreme Court is also responsible for
governing the practice of law in Minnesota. Id.
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Osler, supra note 250.
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fifteen and thirty cases can be heard each session, resulting in only about
sixty cases being heard yearly. 270 Because of this, many applications are
denied before they even reach the Board. 271
Additionally, placing the pardon power exclusively in the hands of
such powerful individuals creates a stressful and highly publicized affair for
both pardon applicants and victims of crime. All pardon applicants are
required to appear before the Board of Pardons at one of the biannual
meetings. 272 In addition, the victims of the applicant’s crimes are often also
asked to appear at the meeting. 273 This makes for a traumatic encounter for
all involved. 274 In June of 2019, this was apparent when Thomas Ondov,
convicted of raping his niece in 1990, appeared before the Board. 275
Ondov’s victim was asked to testify before the Board. 276 She told the Board,
“There is no pardon for me. That can never be erased.” 277 She went on to
say, “I can’t erase it and I don’t think it should be erased for the person
who’s responsible for causing me and my entire family so much harm and
pain.” 278 After taking this testimony, the Board unanimously rejected
Ondov’s pardon request. 279 Not only are pardon applicants forced to relive
their crimes in front of three of the most powerful individuals in Minnesota,
so are the victims. 280
Additionally, the Board members likely contemplate their public
image when hearing applications and testimony. 281 During Ondov’s case,
Attorney General Keith Ellison commented, “[t]he offense is sort of what
really has me hung up, I’m really worried about what signal we might send
to victims and to the community at large.” 282 The public perception of these
three officials granting pardons to offenders, particularly violent offenders,
will continue to restrict the Board of Pardons. 283 Perhaps that accountability
is a good thing. Some may argue that offenders such as Ondov have
270
271

Id.
Id.

Dana Ferguson, ‘There Is No Pardon for Me,’ Woman Tells Tim Walz, Keith Ellison
and Lorie Gildea. They Turned Down Her Rapist’s Pardon Request, ST. PAUL PIONEER
272

PRESS (Minn.) (June 25, 2019), https://www.twincities.com/2019/06/25/there-is-no-pardonfor-me-woman-tells-tim-walz-keith-ellison-and-lorie-gildea-they-turned-down-her-rapistspardon-request/ [https://perma.cc/4K7R-385P].
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Ondov gave his victim drugs and alcohol without her knowledge, and he proceeded to
kiss, touch and rape her. Id. He was convicted of first degree criminal sexual misconduct in
1991 and sentenced to 86 months in prison. Id.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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committed such violent crimes that they do not deserve mercy from these
three officials. However, it remains troubling that public perception may be
weighing heavily on the members of the Board when they hear applications
and testimony during this process. This, in addition to the busy schedules
of all three members of the Board, makes it clear that this job should not
be left to three of the highest-ranking officials in Minnesota’s government.

2. The Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Not Sit
on the Board of Pardons.
Perhaps the most troubling issue with the Minnesota Board of Pardons
is that the chief justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court is a member of the
Board and wields absolute veto power. 284 Serving in the capacity of their
official roles, each member of the Board brings a different insight to the
proceedings. 285 There is no doubt that acting in the official capacity as the
head of the judiciary, the chief justice brings a particular mindset and
framework to the proceedings.
Some may argue that this brings a beneficial separation of powers
framework to the Board of Pardons. Current Chief Justice of the Minnesota
Supreme Court, Lori Gildea, remarked that “I think the pardon board in
the sense that there are three of us working together, and we can be a check
and balance on each other and hopefully a help to each other . . . is a good
thing.” 286 Despite Chief Justice Gildea’s beliefs, having a member of the
judicial branch on the Board of Pardons may do more harm than good.
Typically, pardons are a grant of executive clemency. 287 Most
commonly, on the state level, governors are given the ultimate authority to
make clemency decisions because they are the head of the executive branch
within the states. 288 In this kind of pardon structure, the governor is usually
assisted in the pardoning process by an administrative agency. 289 Some states
employ a hybrid system where the clemency power is only exercised by a
governor with approval from an administrative board. 290 A few states grant
clemency authority to an independent board, with the members being
appointed by the governor. 291 It is entirely unique and unusual in Minnesota
to have the head of the judiciary sit on the Board of Pardons. 292 If this is wise
policy, as Chief Justice Gildea believes, it seems as though at least some
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
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292

See MINN. CONST. art. V, § 7; MINN. STAT. § 638.02, subdiv. 1 (2020).
Osler, supra note 250.
Montemayor, supra note 145.
LOVE, supra note 126, at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 23–26.
See generally 50-State Comparison: Pardon Policy & Practice, RESTORATION OF RTS.

PROJECT,
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-statecomparisoncharacteristics-of-pardon-authorities-2/ [https://perma.cc/J38B-D9RE].
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other states would have adopted a similar approach. And yet, Minnesota is
the only state to give its chief justice absolute veto power over grants of
clemency. 293
It is wise public policy to exclude members of the judicial branch from
the pardoning process. There are key advantages to vesting the pardon
power within the hands of the executive branch. 294 First, “undivided
responsibility placed in the hands of the executive encourages a sense of
care and scrupulousness in making clemency decisions that might be lost if
the responsibility were shared with the courts.” 295 Second, involving a
member of the judicial branch is inconsistent with the purpose of grants of
clemency. 296 Chief Justice Rehnquist commented on this in Ohio Adult
Parole Authority v. Woodard. 297 He remarked that the pardon power is
intended “to grant clemency as a matter of grace, thus allowing the executive
to consider a wide range of factors not comprehended by earlier judicial
proceedings and sentencing determinations.” 298
The governor and the chief justice go into pardon proceedings with
different considerations. 299 The key to the rule of law for judges is to apply
the law evenly and fairly. 300 Judges must make legal proceedings clear and
transparent and balance the rights of all individuals. 301 While fair application
of the law to the facts is an important hallmark of judicial decision-making,
pardons are supposed to be an executive act of mercy by the government. 302
Clemency is about forgiveness and grace. 303 It is an exception to the strict
enforcement of criminal laws. 304 When granting a pardon, more than just the
law and the facts of the crime must be considered. 305 Clemency is about
looking into the defendant’s circumstances and considering whether they
deserve to be legally and morally released from the burdens imposed
because of their crimes. 306 A judge, particularly the head of the judiciary,
should not take part in this process.
This issue is particularly relevant when looking at Amreya Shefa’s case.
293
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Daniel T. Kobil, Compelling Mercy: Judicial Review and the Clemency Power, 9 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 698, 704 (2012).
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Both the Governor and the Attorney General voted in favor of her
pardon. 307 Governor Walz and Attorney General Ellison heard her story of
abuse and were compelled to take this into account when considering
whether to forgive Shefa for her crime. 308 It was Chief Justice Gildea who
was responsible for the denial of Shefa’s pardon. 309 Chief Justice Gildea said
she could not support the pardon because “[t]he crime caused the death of
a person, so it’s on that basis that I don’t support Ms. Shefa’s pardon
application.” 310 Chief Justice Gildea refused the pardon because Shefa killed
her husband. 311 While Chief Justice Gildea’s judicial decision-making
process makes sense in the context of a court case, different factors must be
considered when determining whether to grant an act of grace, such as a
pardon. Amreya Shefa committed manslaughter in the heat of passion, and
it was not self-defense. 312 But because Shefa’s crime resulted in the death of
her husband, Chief Justice Gildea did not fully consider the physical abuse
Shefa endured at the hands of her husband for years, the time she spent in
ICE custody after she served her sentence, and the terrifying ramifications
if she were deported back to Ethiopia. 313 Factors like these should be looked
at when granting a pardon. A pardon is about mercy and forgiveness for the
defendant’s crimes, and the chief justice, acting in their official capacity on
the Board of Pardons, is not a good fit for this role. It is unwise to allow the
head of the judiciary to serve such an important role in grants of clemency
in Minnesota.
VI.

THE SOLUTION TO MINNESOTA’S PARDON PROBLEM

With all of these issues plaguing the Minnesota Board of Pardons, it is
important to start working towards a solution. As Attorney General Ellison
commented in 2019, “I think we’ve got some work to do if we’re going to
consider ourselves a state that is enlightened and believes in creating hope
for people who have made serious mistakes.” 314 In 2019, State
Representative Jamie Long from Minneapolis sponsored a bill to reform
the current pardoning system in Minnesota. 315 The bill would have
established a Clemency Review Commission in Minnesota. 316
The commission would consist of nine members, and each would
307

Compl. at 2, Shefa v. Ellison, No. 52-CV-20-3090 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2020).
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Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2015).
Sepic, supra note 57.
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serve a four-year term. 317 The commission would meet four times every
year. 318 The governor, attorney general, and chief justice would each appoint
three members and be responsible for replacing members at the end of their
term. 319 The commission would review applications for pardons and
commutations before they are considered by the Board of Pardons. 320 The
commission would then make a recommendation for each eligible applicant
on whether they should be granted a pardon or not. 321 The commission
would hear from victims and law enforcement at their meetings which would
then assist the commission in making a recommendation to the Board. 322
The commission would make a positive or negative recommendation by
majority vote for each petition submitted, with the vote of each commission
member reported to the Board of Pardons in writing. 323 Finally, every
pardon would be granted by a majority vote of the Board duly convened,
and the governor would be required to be within that majority. 324 This would
eliminate the unanimous vote requirement, therefore eliminating the
absolute veto power of both the attorney general and the chief justice of the
Minnesota Supreme Court. 325
Implementing a Clemency Review Commission would solve a number
of the problems that burden the current pardoning system in Minnesota.
Unfortunately, the legislative session adjourned prior to the passage of the
bill, so Minnesota has yet to implement this reform. 326 Legislators must
continue to push for this change to the Board of Pardons. A Clemency
Review Commission and the accompanying legal changes to the Board of
Pardons would solve many issues that weigh down the current pardoning
system. This would remedy the constitutional concerns about separation of
powers by utilizing a majority vote by the Board, instead of a unanimous
one, to grant pardons. 327 It would remedy the prudential issues by putting a
large portion of the decision-making in the hands of the designated
Clemency Review Commission. 328 Further, it would relieve some of the
procedural strain on the Board by holding four meetings a year, instead of
two, as well as by putting the application process into the hands of the
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commission prior to reaching the Board. 329 All of these features would
improve the pardoning process in Minnesota.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Minnesota’s pardon system is in desperate need of reform and
rehabilitation. With steadily declining numbers for both applications and
grants of clemency, it is clear that this process is becoming more and more
difficult for applicants to overcome. 330 This is largely due to the inefficiencies
caused by procedural, constitutional, and prudential issues that strain the
Board of Pardons. 331
Procedurally, applicants face a difficult, confusing, and largely
inaccessible process that limits the number of pardons that can be granted
in a year. 332 Increased regulation of this process has led to inefficiencies. 333
Many of these regulations stem from a declining faith in rehabilitation and
a push for tough-on-crime policies by the Minnesota Legislature. 334
The constitutional issues stem from the Minnesota Legislature taking
the power of clemency away from Minnesota’s Executive Department
through both the legislatively-referred constitutional amendment and the
unanimous vote statute. 335 Additionally, not only are convicted persons in
Minnesota subject to the will of the governor, but they must also face the
attorney general and chief justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court when
they apply for a pardon. 336 Furthermore, the unanimous vote requirement is
inconsistent with the text and structure of the Minnesota Constitution. 337
Finally, Minnesota’s current pardon process is riddled with prudential
issues. 338 It is unwise to give complete responsibility for this power to the
state’s three highest ranking officials. 339 Not only are these individuals
extraordinarily busy, but as they act in their official capacities on the Board,
it is clear that they will consider the image they project in their official role
when they decide grants of clemency. 340
It is even more unwise to allow the chief justice of the Minnesota
Supreme Court, the head of the judicial branch, to take part in this
process. 341 The judicial branch should stay out of this process entirely; its
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role has been completed after the conviction was served. 342 Clemency is
intended to be an executive act of mercy. 343 Those that grant pardons must
consider not just the law and the facts of the crime, but also additional
circumstances. 344 Acting in their official capacity, the chief justice of the
Minnesota Supreme Court brings a judicial lens that does not belong in the
pardoning process. 345
There is a solution to these problems. 346 A Clemency Review
Commission, as proposed to the Minnesota Legislature in 2019, would
remedy many of these issues. 347 There needs to be an increased effort to
pass this legislation. 348 Those deserving of a pardon should not be held back
by procedural, constitutional, and prudential inefficiencies. As Alexander
Hamilton stated in Federalist No. 74, “[h]umanity and good policy conspire
to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as
possible fettered or embarrassed.” 349 In both the interest of public policy and
in the humanity of individuals convicted, the state of Minnesota must reform
its pardoning process.
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